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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
was granted the power to auction licenses for use of the electromagnetic
spectrum in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in which Con-
gress added section 3090) to the Communications Act.' Congress man-
dated the new auction policy on the grounds that new telecommunications
services were to be deployed quickly, but also that licenses be assigned to
"a wide variety of applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone
companies, and businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women."2 In general, auctions have been a faster and less costly means of
license assignment than previous FCC methods. As the auction process has
progressed, however, it is apparent that the mandate for speed and effi-
ciency has clashed with the preference programs established to facilitate
the diversity mandate. Specifically, in some instances, the very structure of
the preference programs has encouraged entry of comparatively inefficient
telecommunications providers. In turn, this has led to delay in the provi-
sion of telecommunications services to consumers.
This Article attempts to isolate the delays in license allocation and in
the provision of consumer services that are directly associated with the
FCC preference programs for small, woman, and minority-owned busi-
nesses. This Article then estimates the consumer costs associated with
those delays and compares those costs to the quantifiable benefits of the
preference programs-such as subsidies to producers and enhanced auc-
tion revenues for the government. In other words, the Article constructs the
framework for a social welfare analysis to assess changes in both producer
and consumer welfare as well as the amount of deadweight loss-the
amount that is not captured by either telecommunications producers or
consumers-associated with the preference program structure.
1. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002, §
309(j), 107 Stat. 312, 387-88 (codified at 47 U.S.C.).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (1994).
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HI. GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FCC DESIGNATED ENTITY
PREFERENCE PROGRAM
The FCC adopted its initial regulations governing general auction
structure on March 8, 1994. To meet its mandate of assigning licenses to a
wide variety of applicants, the FCC structured the auction under the as-
sumption that the primary impediment to participation by small businesses
and minority or woman-owned firms was their lack of access to private
capital markets.
To compensate for this lack of access, or more precisely the inability
of small start-up firms to obtain low-interest financing, the FCC estab-
lished a program of multitiered benefits-consisting of various combina-
tions of government financing programs and bidding credits-for "desig-
nated" bidders. To be designated for a particular benefit package, the
potential bidder had to meet certain criteria based on firm size and owner-
ship status. A few subcategories of the designated entity status were fairly
consistent across auctions. The FCC categorized designated entities by av-
erage revenues over the three years preceding the filing for auction eligi-
bility. The most widely used categories were very small business, for those
firms with average revenues of $15 million; small business, for those with
revenues not in excess of $40 million; and entrepreneur, for those with
revenues in excess of $40 million and not in excess of $125 million.4 En-
trepreneurs were to have no more than $500 million in gross assets.5
This Article highlights only two of the several auctions with desig-
nated entity programs: the Regional Narrowband Personal Communica-
tions Services (RNPCS) and the Personal Communications Services (PCS)
6C block auctions.
Il. DESCRIPTION OF DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH DESIGNATED
ENTITY PREFERENCES
By examining the performance of the designated entities versus their
nondesignated counterparts, one can compare the delays from license allo-
3. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Fifth Report & Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, para. 174, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 859
(1994) [hereinafter Competitive Bidding Fifth Report & Order].
4. See generally Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-
Competitive Bidding Narrowband PCS, Third Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 175, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1211
(1994).
5. For a summary of financial caps and offered benefits for selected auctions, see app.
tbl.1.
6. To see where these two auctions fall in the context of the 17 auctions scheduled,
there is a summary of all the auctions divided by license type, number of licenses auctioned,
net high bids, dates of the auction, and number of rounds in app. tbl.2.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
cation until market deployment associated with the various program
structures. Specifically, this Article examines the licensing and subsequent
performance of the RNPCS firms and the licensing and subsequent per-
formance of the designated entities in the C block versus the nondesig-
nated entities of the A and B block auction.
A. The Auction Process Versus Previous Methods
Auctions were intended to correct problems associated with lotteries
and comparative hearings-the previous FCC license assignment proce-
dures. It was argued that auctions would reduce rent seeking, speed li-
censes into the marketplace, capture license rents for the Federal Treasury
rather than "squander" them on lucky or politically connected applicants,
and enhance performance because the auction winners would be most
• . 7
likely to implement services most efficiently.
When comparing the time delays associated with various assignment
methodologies, it is important to be precise in setting the end points. While
the evidence indicates that, on average, auctions reduce the time between
license application and license grant, it is more difficult to determine dif-
ferences in time from license grant to time of market deployment. It must
be noted that this analysis does not measure the total "regulatory lag,"
which would include the time delay associated with FCC spectrum alloca-
tion. Licenses to operate wireless businesses are issued by the FCC only
after a rule making has established how a given block of radio spectrum is
to be utilized by private parties. The FCC's block allocation function re-
mains intact across all three license assignment methods and, hence, is not
the subject of this inquiry.
The average number of days between the application for, and the
grant of, an auctioned license is approximately 233 days for all licenses
auctioned and 276 days for broadband PCS excluding C block. That is 136
to 179 days faster than license distribution under the lottery system. The
differential between auctions and comparative hearings is greater still, with
auctions averaging between 444 and 487 days faster.8
7. It has been estimated that the ten-year delay in allocating additional licenses for
wireless services cost the U.S. economy 2% of its Gross National Product, or approximately
$80 billion. Jeffrey H. Rohlfs et al., Estimate of the Loss to the United States Caused by the
FCC's Delay in Licensing Cellular Telecommunications (National Economic Research As-
sociates Nov. 1991).
8. FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 9601, app. E
(1997) [hereinafter Spectrum Auctions Report].
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B. Designated Entities Versus Nondesignated Entities in the
Regional Narrowband Personal Communications Services
Auctions
1. From License Allocation to License Grant
In analyzing the use of designated entities, one can compare two dis-
tinct preference structures because of the Supreme Court's landmark deci-
sion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.9 The decision cast doubt on the
FCC's authority to single out minority-owned firms for bidding prefer-
ences. The only observable use of designated entity versus nondesignated
entity status before Adarand was the RNPCS auction.
There, the FCC auctioned thirty licenses-six blocks with five li-
censes each. The licenses allowed the awardee to provide advanced paging
and data services. Any firm, regardless of size, could participate in the
auction, but where nondesignated entities had to pay their full bid price
upon completion of the auction, designated entities-or more precisely,
small businesses-were eligible for a highly favorable payment plan.
Those that qualified for the preference were required to make a down
payment of only 20 percent of their bid at the time of license grant, with
the remaining 80 percent, plus interest set at the Treasury Bond rate of 7.5
percent, to be paid over ten years. Payments on the bid principal were de-
ferred until years three through ten.'0 Assuming that the cost of capital for
firms qualifying for designated entity status was 14 percent, the implicit
subsidy embedded in the financing package constituted over 20 percent of
the net-after credit-price bid.1'
9. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (stating that the constitutionality of all gov-
ernment-imposed racial classifications will be determined under a "strict scrutiny" standard
of review); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that a
state-imposed gender classification was unconstitutional because the state failed to show an
"'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the program).
10. Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Third Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2941, paras. 66-74, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 230
(1994); Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Order on Reconsideration, 9 F.C.C.R. 5306, para. 8, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1342
(1994).
11. To calculate the market value of the subsidy in figure 1, subtract the present value
of payments under the designated entity program from the nonsubsidized price (assumed to
be $1 billion). The subsidy value can be stated in percentage terms by dividing that number
by the purchase price (i.e., $1 billion).
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Figure 1
Implicit Subsidy in Designated Entity Credit Terms:
RNPCS License Auctions
Example Assuming: $1 billion bid, 14% cost of capital
Principal Interest Total Present
Year Payment Payment Payment Value
($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
0 200.0 0.0 200.0 200.0
1 0.0 60.0 60.0 52.6
2 0.0 60.0 60.0 46.2
3 100.0 60.0 160.0 108.0
4 100.0 52.5 152.5 90.3
5 100.0 45.0 145.0 75.3
6 100.0 37.5 137.5 62.6
7 100.0 30.0 130.0 52.0
8 100.0 22.5 122.5 42.9
9 100.0 15.0 115.0 35.4
10 100.0 7.5 107.5 29.0
SUM 794.3
In addition to the installment plan, a bidding credit of 25 percent was
awarded to any small business that bid on one of the ten licenses in blocks
two and six-that is, for each dollar bid a small business paid only $0.75.
Small businesses that were also owned by women or minorities12 received
an additional 15 percent, a total bidding credit of 40 percent, in blocks two
and six. These credits effectively reserved blocks two and six for desig-
nated entities.
It took 105 rounds of bidding to determine the final nine winners. Of
this group, four designated entities won a total of eleven licenses, and five
other bidders won a total of nineteen licenses. The government's net reve-
nue for the RNPCS auction was posted at $394 million. 3
12. To qualify as a minority or woman-owned business, the "control group," composed
of members of a minority group and/or of women, was required to hold 25% of firm equity.
Up to 75% of the firm's equity could belong to passive investors who on their own would
not have qualified for the special minority or woman-owned designation. The control group
had to also hold a minimum of 50.1% of the voting stock. Competitive Bidding Fifth Report
& Order, supra note 3, paras. 160-62.
13. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Regional Narrowband (PCS) Auction Charts:
Fact Sheet (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions/rnpcs/Mpl
fact.html>.
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Of the twenty-eight bidders to qualify, twenty had some form of
preference, and those preferences significantly influenced the outcome of
the auction. The incentives attracted many bidders to the set-aside licenses,
and competition among designated entities was intense. Aided by bidder's
credits and installment payments, designated entities bid up the prices paid
by nondesignated entities in blocks one, three, four, and five. The desig-
nated entity demand was so strong that even taking account of both the
bidding credit and the installment subsidy, the designated firms paid more
for blocks two and six than the nondesignated firms would have been
willing to pay.' 4 Only one small business won a license outside of blocks
two or six. However, that small business still qualified for the installment
plan.
2. From License Grant to Market
As of July 1998, all designated entity RNPCS licensees have devel-
oped services, either on their own or through resale contracts as quickly,
but not as fully, as their nondesignated entity counterparts.'- The only
designated entity to have a national footprint, Conxus, is currently opera-
tional in ten major markets. Of the other three licensed designated entities,
at least two are reselling within their license area. These ratios are quite
favorable to those of the nondesignated businesses. Only one of the five
nondesignated entities, SkyTel, is currently operational. The other four are
reselling the services of the two facilities-based providers.
However, future plans for deployment sharply separate the two
groups. Whereas four of the five nondesignated entities expected to have
their own systems deployed by the end of 1998, only one designated entity,
Conxus, has plans to expand its system.
C. The A and B PCS Block Auction Versus C Block
1. Time to Auction
The C block auction was first contemplated as a set-aside auction ex-
clusive to woman and minority-owned businesses. However, before the
auction was planned and executed, the Supreme Court decided Adarand.
Due to the outcome of that case, the FCC had to reassess its original C
block auction design. The allocation of the 493 licenses within the C block
was subsequently delayed for over six months; the auction originally
14. Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative
Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REv. 761,790.
15. See app. tbls.3 & 4.
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scheduled for spring of 1995 did not begin until December 1995. The sus-
ceptibility of preferences to greater administrative process, as well as to
• 16
legal challenges from would-be competitors, is a factor to be included
when calculating policy costs and benefits.
In the C block auction, the FCC sold the fifth license for the provi-
sion of wireless telephone services in any given market following the
wireline and non-wireline cellular licenses and the A and B block PCS li-
censes. The broadband PCS licenses of the C block were allocated to per-
mit mobile voice and data transmissions. In contrast to RNPCS, designated
entity status was required for eligibility in the auction.' 7 The C block be-
came termed an "entrepreneur block" due to the restriction on bidding en-
trants to include only firms classified under the blanket definition of "en-
trepreneur," which included entrepreneurs, small, and very small
businesses. Again, an entrepreneur was defined as a firm with average
revenues under $125 million and total assets under $500 million. Passive
nonvoting investment by firms of unlimited size was allowed, however,
and the attribution rules were liberal, allowing for as much as 75 percent of
the total equity of the firm to be held by large investors who would other-
wise not be eligible to bid."
As originally designed pre-Adarand, the C block was framed akin to
the RNPCS auction. It allowed for a 10 percent bidding credit for small
businesses and an additional 15 percent credit to minority and woman-
owned businesses.' 9 However, these rules were modified after the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand: All small businesses were eligible for the 25
percent bidding credit.20
In addition to the bidding credit, small businesses were eligible for an
installment plan slightly more favorable than that in the RNPCS auction. A
down payment of only 10 percent-as opposed to 20 percent-was due at
the time of license grant, with the remaining 90 percent to be paid over ten
years at an interest rate of 6.5 percent, as discussed infra at Part IV.A.
Principal payments in the C block were deferred three years, compared to
16. See, e.g., Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
17. The rules for F block were similar. Eligibility for the C and F blocks' set-asides
was limited "to entities that, together with their affiliates and certain investors, have gross
revenues of less than $125 million in each of the last two years and total assets of less than
$500 million." Competitive Bidding Fifth Report & Order, supra note 3, para. 121.
18. The attribution rules are analogous to those of minority and woman-owned small
businesses. Id. paras. 130-47.
19. Id. para. 130.
20. See Omnipoint Corp., 78 F.3d at 632-33; see also Implementation of Section 309(.)
of the Communications Act--Competitive Bidding Amendment of the Comm'n's Cellular
PCS Cross-Ownership Rules, Sixth Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 136, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 934 (1995).
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the two-year deferment in the RNPCS auction. Therefore, the value of the
implicit subsidy in the installment plan was higher for the C block than it
was for the RNPCS designated entities-a value of about 28 percent of bid
price versus 20 percent-under reasonable assumptions concerning the
opportunity cost of capital.
Figure 2
Implicit Subsidy in Designated Entity Credit Terms:
PCS C Block License Auctions
Example Assuming: $1 billion bid, 14% cost of capital
Principal Interest Total Present
Year Payment Payment Payment Value
($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
1 0.0 58.5 58.5 51.3
2 0.0 58.5 58.5 45.0
3 0.0 58.5 58.5 39.5
4 128.6 58.5 187.1 110.8
5 128.6 50.2 178.8 92.9
6 128.6 41.8 170.4 77.6
7 128.6 33.5 162.1 64.8
8 128.6 25.0 153.6 53.8
9 128.6 16.7 145.3 44.7
10 128.6 8.3 136.9 36.9
SUM 717.3
2. Time from Auction to License Grant
The A and B block auction assigned ninety-nine licenses: two in each
of fifty-one Major Trading Areas (MTAs), with three licenses being as-
signed by the FCC's policy of "pioneer's preferences" for companies con-
tributing innovative technology. It took ninety-eight days to complete the
112 rounds of bidding, making the A and B block the fastest broadband
auction to date. At the end of bidding on August 13, 1995, eighteen win-
ners emerged with reported revenue to the federal government of $7.736
billion. Because the winning bidders were mostly previous filers with the
FCC, review of the bidders' final applications for licenses was expedited.
There was little delay in granting licenses once bidding closed.21
21. See app. tbl.2.
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The C block was a different story. The special ownership rules and
specific criteria of the preference program increased administrative analy-
sis and competitor scrutiny. A notable example of licensing delay is that of
General Wireless, Inc. (GWI), the third highest bidder in the C block auc-
tion, whose application was not granted until nine months after the auction
was closed.
In general, it took approximately 400 days from the start of the C
block auction to the time when almost all licenses were granted, compared
to less than 100 days for the A and B block. The increase in time is due in
part to the increased number of both licenses and winning applicants-
eighty-nine in the C block versus eighteen in the A and B block. The C
block auction itself took 140 days and consisted of 184 rounds. In the end,
the 493 auctioned licenses garnered $10.216 million net of bidding credits.
The average price per person in the relevant market was almost $40 in the
C block compared to $15 to $16 per person in the A and B blocks; 2 alter-
natively, the average price paid per person per MHz was $1.35 in the C
block compared to only $0.51 in the A and B blocks.23
The C block license agreement hit a delay soon after the close of the
auction when two bidders-having "won" eighteen licenses-could not
pay the down payment within five days. 24 Because the licenses had not yet
been transferred, the FCC was able to announce a reauction of the eighteen
licenses just twenty-four days after the close of the C block auction. The
auction itself took place on July 3, 1997. The total time from the end of the
original auction to the determination of winning bids was less than eighty
days. Unfortunately, this was only the first of longer delays to come.
3. The C Block Settlement
Although the exceptionally high bids from the C block auction were,
at first, a source of pride to the FCC, it became readily apparent that the
license winners would not be able to fund their bids. Several large license
holders threatened bankruptcy, potentially throwing the licenses into legal
proceedings with uncertain outcomes. The FCC's claim that it fully owned
and controlled the licenses, even those licenses assigned by competitive
bidding, had never been decided by a court. The threat of the bankruptcies,
therefore, was that the licenses would be held by the license winners until
courts could determine the rights of the FCC and the winners' other credi-
22. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 8, at 9632 n.52.
23. CBO, WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? THE FCC AuCTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT xii tbl.1 (Apr. 1997).
24. Under FCC rules, winning bidders had five working days to pay the first half of the
down payment-that is, 5% of total bid price, net of credits.
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tors. At the very least, the possibility of bankruptcy litigation meant long
delays in the time consumers would benefit from the services represented
by each license. More salient to regulators, perhaps, was the spectacle of
the FCC fighting "preferred" bidders for money while the much touted
auction plan leaked billions of dollars in defaults. The FCC decided to
work out a settlement plan releasing bidders from commitments made at
auction.
After declaring a moratorium on installment payments on March 31,
1997, the FCC announced its new settlement plan on September 25, 1997.
The C block winners were given three choices: (1) full amnesty with the
return of a license, (2) the disaggregation of licenses, or (3) the resumption
of payments.2 By July 1998, over 262 licenses had been returned to the
FCC under the various settlement alternatives.26 This accounts for 53 per-
cent of the 493 licenses first auctioned in the C block. Returns as a per-
centage of licenses rise to 62 percent if the sixty-seven licenses for which
an election has not been made are excluded. 27
The rate of license sales in the secondary market can be a measure of
efficiency. A high resale rate would signify that the initial allocation was
relatively inefficient. The en masse return of designated entity licenses and
the number of bidders completely withdrawing from the industry are,
therefore, preliminary evidence that the loss of efficiency in license as-
signment is substantial. By way of comparison, in 1991 there were sev-
enty-five resales out of approximately 1,400 cellular telephone licenses
25. See app. tbl.5.
26. Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Announces Broadband Personal Communi-
cations Services C Block Elections, Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. 16,705 (1998) [hereinafter
C Block Public Notice]. See also app. tbls.1-5.
27. As of July 1998, three firms hold the 67 licenses for which there is yet to be an
election. NextWave is by far the largest holder with a total of 63 C block licenses. Anish-
nabe holds three licenses and Southern Communications Systems holds one license. C
Block Public Notice, supra note 26, app. D. It should be noted that NextWave won more
than 64 C block licenses for which it bid approximately $4.4 billion, accounting for roughly
41% of the reported C block revenue of $10.2 million. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC,
Broadband PCS: C Block Auction Fact Sheet (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/
wtb/auctions/blk.c/5hbidder.gif>. The NextWave decision will obviously have a major im-
pact, not only on government revenues, but also on the business plans of many of the C
block winners. NextWave accumulated sufficient licenses to establish a national footprint
that it intended to build-out and market exclusively to resellers. At least seven of the C
block winners had contracted to resell NextWave services. See CBO, Impending Defaults
by Winning Bidders in the FCC's C Block Auction: Issues and Options (visited Mar. 15,
1999) <http:/www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=37&sequence=O&from =1>.
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distributed by lottery from 1984 to 1989. 2' Following the broadband PCS
A and B block auction, twelve licenses were resold in 1996.29
In addition to the inefficiency of initial allocation, the delay in dis-
tributing licenses has been significant. The original auction began in De-
cember 1995. Nearly three years later, 262 licenses of 493 have yet to be
assigned. It is difficult to estimate how much more delay can be expected
in the reauction of the returned licenses. While the chosen mechanism
proved speedy in the first C block reauction, that reauction only involved
eighteen licenses under the same minority preference rules as the original
C block auction. This reauction will entail the design of new rules and may
have more bidders.
4. Time to Market
Given the fact that, as of the time of the writing of this Article, the
FCC is still in the process of assigning C block licenses, it is difficult to
judge how quickly C block licenses will deploy new services. Because the
focus of this Article is to isolate the delays associated with designated en-
tities versus nondesignated firms, the time to market comparison is better
left until a future date when the relevant, designated entity data is avail-
able.
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE COSTS OF THE DESIGNATED ENTITY
PROGRAMS
Unfortunately, it is difficult to calculate the social welfare costs of
delays in the deployment of licenses without more information than is
readily available. What follows is a rough approximation of the costs and
benefits to designated entities, the federal government, and consumers.
A. The Value of Designated Entity Subsidies
A subsidy to an FCC auction participant can also be thought of as
forgone government revenues that could have been used to reduce taxpay-
ers' liability. Government funds used to subsidize designated entities are a
welfare transfer from consumers to producers. One direct subsidy to the
designated entities was the bidding credit awarded to them by the FCC.
Depending on the auction, this credit ranged from 10 to 40 percent of the
amount bid. Yet, winning prices bid by designated entities, net of bidding
credits, were at or above the prices paid by nondesignated entity bidders.
28. Thomas W. Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from
Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425, 429 (1993).
29. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 8, at 9625.
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Evidence of this price inflation is found in both the RNPCS auction and
the C block auction.
30
Not only do bidding credits appear to be "bid away," but the low-
interest installment plan appears to drive auction prices even higher. This
is predicted by economic theory, as the value of the license-including fi-
nancing subsidies-is equivalent to the market price that an auction is de-
signed to reveal. Under this plan the qualified bidders receive essentially
two subsidies: the value of low-interest financing over the payment period
and the value of the deferment of principal payments until years three or
four. In addition to what the FCC explicitly granted designated entity bid-
ders, some bidders seem to have viewed the rules more favorably yet. Be-
cause the FCC installment plan allowed bidders to incur liabilities without
collateral, the obligation could be opportunistically interpreted to include
an option-the licensee would continue to pay only if the market value of
the license rose to justify the high auction bid. In the event of a downturn
in license values, a licensee could suspend payments-that is, choose not
to "exercise its option." Adding to the value of the latter position would be
the possibility of keeping the license under protection of bankruptcy. This
path is not fanciful; it was successfully pursued by GWI. General Wireless,
Inc. bid $1.06 billion for a set of fourteen C block PCS licenses and paid
its $106 million down payment-then transferred FCC licenses to shell
corporations without other assets. General Wireless then declared bank-
ruptcy and sought reduction of its FCC debt alleging fraudulent convey-
ance. The bankruptcy court reduced GWI's liability to $166 million, wip-
ing out about $894 million in debt obligations.3'
The value to designated entities of the low-interest financing is con-
siderable. Designated entities received financing at 6.5 percent to 7.5 per-
cent interest, a rate far below market. The subsidy value is equivalent to
the present value of the installment payments discounted by the risk-
adjusted interest rate. Choosing the proper discount rate is always prob-
lematic, but since designated entities are largely start-up companies, a rea-
sonable discount rate is 14 percent.3 The installment subsidy is equivalent
to a subsidy of about 28 percent of the net bid.3
30. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 14, at 791.
31. See Transcript at 43, line 22, In re GWI, PCS (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 1998)
(Bankr. No. 397-39676-SAF-11).
32. Id. at 14.
33. See supra Part II.C.1 fig.2. Compare this value to the estimated value of the
RNPCS auction subsidies, where the Authors calculate about a 20.6% subsidy value as-
suming 14% cost of capital. See supra Part 1lI.B.1 fig.1.
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The installment payments and the lower interest rate explain only
about one to two-thirds of the increase in bids in the C block auction.34
Theories explaining the additional differential include: changes in the
capital market between auctions; the need to pay an aggregation premium
in the C block to have the equivalent of an MTA license similar to those of
the A and B block; or the failure of C block bidders to fully discount their
bid in anticipation of the "winner's curse." None are compelling; given the
massive defaults evidenced, the most appealing explanation is that the
preference program itself encouraged opportunistic bidding. The resulting
costs and delays due to nonpayment of bids and the need to reauction the
licenses are, therefore, consumer welfare costs directly associated with the
preference program.
To explain further, opportunism is defined as the adoption of a bid-
ding strategy based on revenue projections that are not fully justified as-
suming compliance with the terms of the financing contract. An opportun-
istic bid is one in which the bidder increases the amount bid because it
hedges against adverse values in the market for telecommunications serv-
ices by leaving open an option to simply not pay the bid. The more viable
the nonperformance option-that is, the fewer penalties associated with a
default-the higher the initial bid. The incentives leading to opportunistic
bidding are apparent in the structure of the low-interest financing terms
used for designated entities. Any scheme that defers the payment of the li-
cense fee shifts downside risk from the bidder to the government, since the
bidder can default on its promised payment to the government if license
values fall below the net auction price. Thus, it effectively insures the bid-
der against losses at the government's expense.35 Consequently, small
firms have aggressively bid and won licenses even if they were not among
the most efficient in providing PCS. This exposes the government and
consumers to excessive risks. Opportunism is contagious: In an auction, an
aggressive bidder forces competitors to adapt or drop out. Even firms not
attempting to incoTorate the default option can be pulled in by competi-
tive market forces.
34. The price differential is especially surprising given that game theory predicts that
when items are sold in sequence, the later items usually sell for less than the earlier items
due, in part, to risk-adverse bidders and market advantages associated with early entry. See
Ayres & Cramton, supra note 14, at 780.
35. See Bhaskar Chakravorti et al., Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for
Broadband PCS Spectrum, at 13 (on file with authors).
36. See, e.g., Transcript at 10, In re GWI, Inc. (Bankr. No. 397-39676-SAF-11) (find-
ing that competing bids supported the optimistic bids by GWI).
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B. Government Revenues and Expenditures
1. Revenues
In a social welfare context, government revenues from auctions are
transfers from producers to taxpayers. Intuitively, the higher the aggregate
bid prices, the greater the government revenue raised; and therefore, the
greater the welfare transfer from producers to taxpayers. In a dynamic
context, license values--in the pre-auction assignments by lottery or com-
parative hearings-were not captured by applicants without some costs. A
competition for "windfalls" developed that forced applicants to expend
real resources. The potential savings of such socially wasteful "rent seek-
ing" were the primary argument for initiation of the auction reform. While
more efficient transfers are preferred to less efficient ones, and auctions
have played a positive role here, the most substantial welfare gains are at-
tained via expanded outputs and lower prices. That implies that important
payoffs from FCC licensing are observed when firms invest in infrastruc-
ture to offer competition, thereby driving down service prices and im-
• 37
proving economic efficiency.
2. Expenditures
Government expenditures in auction development, rule making, liti-
gation, and settlements must be netted from the revenues received for an
accurate calculation of consumer welfare changes. Total costs of all FCC
auctions to date have been approximately $74 million, which is about 0.62
percent of the total auction revenues." The FCC spent almost $50 million
on its auctions through fiscal year 1996. A significant amount of spending
through 1996, perhaps as much as one-half, was for auction design, facili-
ties, and hardware and software that the FCC can use for a number of
years.
In a cost comparison to previous alternatives, the auctions have per-
formed quite favorably. While it is difficult to assemble cost figures for
comparative hearings and lotteries, one FCC analysis suggests that the
time necessary to assign licenses and the volume of license applications
are indicators of the cost to both the government and the private sector.39
For example, the comparative hearings for assigning licenses to provide
cellular telephone services in the thirty largest markets took more than two
37. Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy
to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. CoMM. L.J. 87, 107-08 (1997).
38. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 8, at 9624.
39. EVAN KwEREL & ALEx D. FELKER, USING AucIONS TO SELECT FCC LICENSEES 3-6
(FCC, Office of Plans and Policy WorkingPaper Series No. 16, 1985).
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years compared with just several months to auction and assign the
broadband PCS licenses that provided national coverage. The lotteries that
were used to assign the remaining cellular licenses attracted a large vol-
ume of applicants. For example, the thirty licenses available in markets 91
through 120 drew more than 5,000 applications, requiring the Commission
to expend significant resources reviewing them. In contrast, only thirty ap-
plicants sought the first group of broadband PCS licenses that were auc-
tioned.
When a final total is calculated, there is little doubt that the C block
licenses will have been the most costly to assign by auction. Not only will
at least three separate auctions be required, the direct cost to the FCC for
litigation, rule makings, and settlement negotiations will be substantial.
Beyond these direct costs is the potential stream of indirect costs that flow
from the FCC's choice for settlement, as opposed to forced bankruptcies.
The danger is that settlement will only intensify the incentive to engage in
opportunistic behavior in future auctions. This distortion will generate
continuing inefficiencies in the assignment of licenses.
C. Consumer Costs and Benefits
In general, the auctions the FCC held in 1994 through 1998 were less
costly to the private sector than comparative hearings. Ultimately, the cost
of the method of assigning licenses turns on whether the assignment proc-
ess distributes licenses to the parties that value them most. If not, society
bears the cost of additional transactions and likely delays and inefficien-
cies in providing telecommunications services. It is evident that the C
block auction did not accomplish this goal of efficient allocation. Even if
reauction is quickly accomplished, deployment will be delayed by the need
to renegotiate contracts for reselling and build-out financing.
One estimation of what the private sector may expend in transaction
costs as a result of the reauction is by comparison to the secondary market
purchases of cellular telephone licenses initially distributed by lotteries. In
1991, the transaction costs associated with the resale of cellular licenses
have been estimated at $190 million.4°
The greatest cost to consumers emanating from delayed licensing of
telecommunications service providers is in the form of high telecommuni-
cations prices that result from an absence of competition. Economic mod-
els allow one to estimate the effect that firm entry would have on con-
40. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 8, at 9610 (citing Amendment of the
Comm'n's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making and Tentative Decision, 7 F.C.C.R. 5676, para. 57 n.41, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 462 (1992)).
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sumer prices at t = 0. When dealing with a small number of providers, the
profit-maximizing pricing strategy of one firm will inherently depend on
the behavior of the other. Such strategic interactions render pricing out-
comes indeterminate.
A standard method used by economists to analyze oligopoly pricing,
however, views competition proceeding in the following manner: Prices
are set by either firm, in sequence, on the assumption that the other firm's
output will not change as a consequence of its actions. In a duopoly mar-
ket, the first firm will initially set a monopoly price on the assumption that
the second firm will produce nothing. The second firm then sets a lower
price on the assumption that the first firm will continue to produce a mo-
nopoly level of output. The first firm then sets a new price that is lower
than monopoly because now it assumes that the second firm will produce a
positive level of output. The process iterates price and output levels until
both firms set identical levels and, therefore, have no tendency to change.
41This is called a Cournot equilibrium.
Under this set of assumptions, one may analyze what happens to
price as additional firms enter a market featuring constant unit and mar-
ginal costs, using a Lerner Index:
P-MC 1
P ne
where n is the number of competitors and e is the elasticity of demand for
the market as a whole. The Lerner Index shows where a profit-maximizing
firm sets price, given marginal cost and the elasticity of demand.
Figure 3 shows how price will change with entry by new firms under
the assumption of constant elasticity of demand equal to unity and constant
returns to scale.
41. This model is used by policymakers to estimate the likely effect of new entry on
service prices in telecommunications markets. See EvAN KwEREL & JOHN WILLIAMS,
CHANGING CHANNELS: VOLUNTARY REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEVISION SPECTRUM 82-83
(FCC, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper Series No. 27, 1992).
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Figure 3
Price Changes with Competitive Entry in Cournot Equilibrium
No. of Elasticity of Price/MC % Price Drop w/
Firms Mkt. Demand Ratio Marginal Entrant
2 1 2.00
3 1 1.50 25.00
4 1 1.33 11.30
5 1 1.25 6.00
6 1 1.20 4.00
7 1 1.17 2.50
100 1 1.01 0.01
00 1 1.00 0.00
The results of this analysis are straightforward. Consumer prices are
expected to decline with the number of entrants, barring some possibility
for potential entrants to bargain with customers or to otherwise credibly
threaten entry. Since barriers to entry in a market requiring federal licens-
ing are secure-firms without licenses simply cannot compete-the analy-
sis developed here is thought by economists to be a good representation of
what will happen in real markets: Firms will reliably set prices above what
would prevail in the face of additional entrants. In determining the likely
price differences that result from adding a third competitor to the cellular
telephone marketplace, for instance, FCC policy analysts Evan Kwerel and
John Williams infer a price reduction of 25 percent based on this standard
42
economic analysis.
The accuracy of the analysis must be tested by actual marketplace
experience. One study of the wireless telephone industry released in April
1997 reports that markets with one or more broadband PCS operators have
average combined rates for cellular and broadband PCS between 15 per-
cent and 18 percent below the cellular rates in markets with just two cel-
lular operators." In general, PCS operators are setting prices between 10
percent and 15 percent below the cellular operators in their markets." This
42. Id. at 83.
43. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1993,
Third Report, FCC 98-91, at 19 (June 11, 1998) [hereinafter Third Annual CMRS Report].
Another study in September of 1997 estimated that PCS rates were 17% to 20% below cel-
lular. Id. (citing Yankee Group, Competition Begins to Have an Impact on Wireless Pricing,
YANKEEWATCH: MOBILEFLASH, Apr. 18, 1997, at 1).
44. Id. at 4 (citing Yankee Group, Competition Begins to Have an Impact on Wireless
Pricing, YANKEEWATCH: MOBILE FLASH, Apr. 18, 1997, at 3).
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is similar to the theoretical calculations that a third competitor would re-
duce prices by 25 percent and a fourth by about 11 percent. New competi-
tors appear to have a strongly positive impact on rates of subscribership,4
the economic consequences of price reductions of 25 percent or more. In
the Washington, D.C. market, for example, the launch of the APC Sprint
Spectrum system led to a 35 percent to 55 percent decrease in cellular
rates.
46
Setting elasticity of demand to zero, one can determine a first order
approximation of the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers due
to delays caused by administrative problems in assigning PCS C block li-
censes. The C block auction was originally conducted between December
1995 and May 1996; reauction of the bulk of the C block licenses did not
begin until March 1999. Therefore, the Authors assume a delay of three
years.47 Using the simple model of the price-reducing effects of entry out-
lined above, the absence of a fifth competitor results in consumer losses
(i.e., higher prices) approximately equivalent to 0.06 of revenues. A three-
year delay results in additive annual losses equivalent to 0.06 multiplied by
the revenues of the relevant year, compounded to account for the yield
those price savings would generate when reinvested. Assuming the rein-
vestment rate to be 7 percent, the real, long-term yield for U.S. equities,
consumer losses may be approximated as follows.
Figure4
Total Service Consumer Rein- Present
Revenues for Loss vestment Value of
Year Wireless (Revenue x Factor Consumer
Service48  0.06) Loss
(in Millions)
1996 $23,634,971 $1,418,098 1.072 $1,623,580
1997 $27,485,633 $1,649,138 1.07 $1,764,578
1998 $33,133,175 $1,987,990 1.00 $1,987,990
45. United States wireless telephone subscribership reached 69 million in 1998, up
from over 33 million in 1995. Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n, Statistics-Annual Reve-
nues (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.wow-com.com/images/1298datasurvey2.gif>.
46. Third Annual CMRS Report, supra note 43, at 4 n.14.
47. The Authors do not assume that C block licensees would have been operational in
1996, only that the license assignment problems delayed deployment by three years. The
Authors also note that the original schedule for the first C block auction was in the spring of
1995. Therefore, they are conservative in assuming a three-year lag.
48. Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n, supra note 45.
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In sum, a first order approximation of the consumer losses due to the three-
year delay of the C block auction equals $5.376 billion.49
V. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND POINTS FOR FURTHER
STUDY
From the brief analysis presented here, it appears that the private
value-to designated entities-of the various subsidies is zero. Previous
studies have demonstrated that bidding credits and the installment subsidy
are effectively "bid away" by auction participants.5° Moreover, the effect
of the installment subsidies is to encourage competitive and opportunistic
bidding so as to raise the overall license prices paid by designated enti-
ties. 1 Although this may52 result in increased revenues to the government,
it does not fulfill the FCC's intended objective of subsidizing the entry of
those firms.
On the other hand, the cost of these subsidies to consumers is sub-
stantial. As consumer loss has been approximated in this Article, every
year of delay represents in excess of $1.4 billion in lost consumer surplus.
That consumer losses are offset by gains to incumbent operators-by vir-
tue of their opportunity to charge higher prices due to delays in the entry of
new competitors-would be an ironic defense of the preference program:
Incumbents are supposed to be challenged by new competitors, not subsi-
dized at their expense and the expense of the public. The problems inher-
ent in awarding subsidies by taking bids at auction, the designated entity
preference programs' ineffectiveness in encouraging viable competitive
49. This is offset by an equivalent gain to incumbent wireless operators; in the
Authors' first approximation, they rule out welfare issues that accrue when demand retracts
at higher prices-that is, elasticity is less than zero.
50. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 14, at 791. Ayres and Cramton state that "taking
account of both the bidding credit and the installment subsidy" the designated entities paid
more than the nondesignated entities "were willing to pay." Id. at 791. Assuming that the
price nondesignated firms were willing to pay was equivalent to the market price, the dif-
ferential could be explained by the apparent opportunistic bidding evidenced in the C block
auction. However, at other points in their article, Ayres and Cramton are ambiguous as to
whether the entire installment subsidy was in fact bid away. See id. ("The designated [en-
tity] demand was sufficient to compete away virtually all of [the 40 percent] bidding credit.
... [S]uperficially suggest[ing] that the installment subsidy did all the work .... ") The rea-
son some of the installment subsidy might have remained effective is provided earlier in
their article-auctions with few bidders can generate selling prices below the highest bid-
der's valuations. See id. at 766. Therefore, because the RNPCS auction was an auction of
few participants, in contrast to the C block auction, competition among bidders may have
been insufficient to drive the subsidy to zero. If this were the case, any remaining subsidy
value should be accounted for as a producer benefit.
51. See id. at 790.
52. Or may not, when one has accounted for the cost of litigation, bankruptcies, and
delays.
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entry, and the very substantial costs borne by consumers strongly suggest
that policymakers should seriously examine options for fundamental re-
forms.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Designated Entity Preferences in Selected Auctions
Aucti an LMDS
Regional All All
Nasrowband
All
Desienated Entity Caos
Very Small Business n/a $15 million $15 million $15 million
Small Business $40 million $40 million $40 million $40 million
Entrepreneur $125 million $125 million $75 million
($500 million assets) ($500 million assets)
Biddne Credit
Very Small Business n/a 25% 35% 45%
Small Business 25%' 25% 15% 25% 35%
Minority- or Woman- 40% n/a n/a n/a 25%
Owned Small Business
Entrepreneur n/a 25%
Ugfront Paynent 0.015 0.06 0.02
Down Payment
% Nt Winnine Bid
Total 20% 10% 20% 100% 20%
Within 5 Business 10% 5% 10% 20% 10%
Days of Close
Within 5 Business 10% 5% 10% 80% 10%
Days of Gmnt
[istallment Payments for 80% 90%a 80% n/a n/a
Designated Entities (vrsl
Term 10 10 10 n/a n/a
Interest Only 2 6 2 n/a n/a
Interest & Principal 8 4 8 n/a n/a
Only 10 litnses. Blocks 2 & 6 provided for bidding credits
2 Itlmnt plan available only to small bsinesses
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Table 3. Designated Entity Winners of the PCS
Narrowband Regional Auction
Company Name No. NetAmL Bid Ownership Structure Operational?
Licenses
Benbow PCS Ventures 2 $2,140,600 49.9% owned by Reselling SkyTel &
(Arch Comm.) publicly held Arch Conxus services.
Communications Plans to begin network
(Market Value 1996 implementation in 1998.
$168.3 million)
Lisa-aye Shearing 3 $31,764,004 • 49.9% owned by ?
(Adelphia) Adelphia (Market Value
1996XXX)
Insta-Check Systems 11 $8,000,013 *? Reselling in Puerto Rico.
PCS Development 5 $90,926,401 * Over $300 million in Currently deployed in 10
(Conxus Comm.) private placements markets under the name
'"ocketalk".
Source: Thrd Annud CMRS Conpetition Report FCC (1998).
No bidding credit applied.
Table 4. Regional Narrowband PCS - Non Designated Entities
Company No. of Gross Amt. Bid Net Amt. Operational?
Name Licenses Bid
AirTouch 3 $31,218,001 N/A Reselling SkyTel
services.
Deployment expected in
1998.
American 5 $53,621,666 N/A Reselling SkyTel
Paging services.
Deployment expected in
1998.
Ameritech 1 $9,500,000 N/A Reselling SkyTel.
MobileMedia 5 $53,669,092 N/A Reselling SkyTel and
Conxus services.
Deployment expected for
1998.
Pagemart II 5 $92,599,020 N/A Testing in Dallas and
Austin.
Deployment expected in
1998, starting with Texas
cities in second quarter.
Source: Third Annual CMRS Competition Report, FCC (1998).
ASSIGNING WIRELESS LICENSES
Table 5. C Block Settlement Elections
Settlement Choice No. of No. of Percentage of Licenses
Licenses License Auctioned
Holders
Amnesty-Prepayment 83 10 16.84%
Amnesty-Bid 84 31 17.04%
Amnesty-Total 167 41 33.88%
Disaggregation-Resume 101 25 20.48%
Disaggregation-Prepay 28 10 5.68%
Disaggregation-Total 129 35 26.16%
Resume-Prepayment 98 24 19.88%
Not Afford 15 6 3.04%
Defective 6 2 1.22%
No Election 67 3 13.59%
Other 10 2 2.03%
Total 493 113'
Souce: Various FCC Publi Noces, hrp:Aww.fcc gov/wrb
I Some bidders chose multiple strategies for the group of licenses held so that the number of license holders in all
groups exceeds the 89 original winning bidders.
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